


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RESEARCH REPORT

PROGRESS ON A MULTINATIONAL POLICY
AGAINST TERRORISM

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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PROGRESS ON A MULTINATIONAL
POLICY AGAINST TERRORISM

by

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Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM
REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Dr. James E. Winkates

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

March 1989

DISCLAIMER

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Progress on a Multinational Policy Against Terrorism

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Introductory remarks on the threat of terrorism and key initiatives to combat that threat over the past 20 years provide a starting point to assess answers to three questions fundamental to a coherent multinational policy on counterterrorism. Those questions deal with the effect of public opinion on a government's policy; principles and procedures for action against international terrorism; and the multinational decision-making framework that would best serve those principles and procedures.

The analysis centers around the nations best suited to bring pressure against international terrorism--the seven major Western democracies--Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The concluding chapter suggests that most of the groundwork required for a cohesive and cooperative counterterrorist front now exists between (or at least among) these nations, and the main effort will be to maintain the forward momentum.



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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel George P. Gaines, IV (M.A., University of Arizona) is a Latin American specialist, and has served in a number of flying and staff assignments associated with both Latin America and NATO. In 1970 he was a forward air controller, flying out of Hue Phu Bai, RVN for the 101st Airborne Division. From 1975-78 he was assigned to the Western Hemisphere Division, Deputy Directorate for Plans and Policy, Headquarters USAF, and from 1985-88 he was Chief, War Plans Branch, Headquarters Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force, Heidelberg, Germany. He has over 2800 flying hours in a variety of aircraft, including the O-2A, OV-10, F-111A and EF-111A. He is married to the former Lynn B. Johnson and has two daughters. Lieutenant Colonel Gaines is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1989.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism--one of the most pervasive threats of this era, a problem daily confronting world leaders and average citizens alike--is not a modern phenomenon. The use of terror has been with us since the days of the Pentateuch; however, through today's instantaneous media, events which once would have been unremarkable, are now major headlines. Because the reality of our mortality comes relentlessly into our homes, the deadliness of terrorist activities and the threat they pose carry a fright factor disproportionate to what they deserve.

Just what is terrorism, and who are the terrorists? For years, that definitional dilemma has presented a stumbling block in legislative and diplomatic efforts to eradicate the problem. "Deductive" definitions serve to advance inspirational or political aims, but tend to be so broad and vague, they actually serve little purpose.(1:6) As Brian Jenkins stated,

What is called terrorism thus seems to depend on the point of view....At some point in this expanding use of the term, terrorism can mean just what those who use the term (not the terrorists) want it to mean--almost any violent act by any opponent.(2:1)

The search for a specific definition continued into the 1980s while coordinated cooperative work against terrorism floundered on the rocks of definitional disagreement. It now appears, however, that, at least in the short-term, a workable understanding may exist: "In a real sense, terrorism is like pornography: You know it when you see it, but it is impossible to

come up with a universal agreed-upon definition."(3:30) So-called "inductive" definitions provide a series of "...specific categories of criminal acts that together compose an open-ended framework to define terrorism without necessarily even using the term specifically."(1:7) The discussion in this paper will lean heavily on the inductive approach, treating terrorism as those commonly recognized criminal acts committed by terrorist groups for the purpose of achieving some goal.

Similarly, the fuzziness surrounding various definitions of terrorism has added to the uncertainty associated with determining who is a terrorist. Certain groups commit acts of violence for purely domestic aims. Others are motivated by dissatisfaction with "the system" and attempt to foment anarchy as a prelude to a better world. A third group uses terrorism as a form of armed conflict against whomever they see as their enemies. While the world views them as criminals, their activities are conducted in campaign fashion, generally towards an international political goal.

Although there are countless accusations and counterclaims regarding the sources of support for terrorist organizations, it is not within the purview of this paper to discuss specifics of Soviet, Libyan, Syrian or any other involvement in international terrorism. To the extent possible, this paper will address state-supported international terrorism as a generic, commonly agreed upon entity requiring the attention of the major Western powers.

During the last 20 years, approximately 5000 human beings

have died from terrorist acts, making the random, indiscriminate and spectacular nature of those acts the preoccupation of every major Western nation and many Eastern countries.(4:1327) In addition, the increasing publicity generated by the disruption of governments and businesses has heightened terrorists' motivation to step up their efforts.(5:120) In 1985 alone, 900 people died from terrorist actions, reflecting a 30% increase over the previous year. (6:30) Between 1980-1986, 78% of Middle Eastern-derived terrorism occurred in seven nations: France, Italy, Greece, Spain, the United Kingdom, Cyprus and West Germany.(7:1161) During 1986, the percentages of total attacks on U.S. citizens and property in Western Europe and Asia were 21% and 10% respectively.(8:62)

Although the recent history of international attempts to combat terrorism dates back to the League of Nations, only in the last two decades has there been a concerted and continuous effort to develop practical criteria and procedures for a systematic campaign against this threat (9:44-48). Only in the last half of that period have those labors borne fruit.

In 1970, the United Nations (U.N.) began to draft conventions for specific actions committed by terrorists, including hijacking, sabotage, attacks on internationally protected persons and the taking of hostages (Appendix One). The limitation of the U.N., however, was (and is) in the varied legal and political systems of its members. The lack of consensus on the definition and causes of terrorism frustrated any

substantial effort by that body to develop a real deterrent (10:86); therefore it was critical that some other group lead the way in the fight against international terrorism.

One landmark initiative occurred in January 1977 when the European Council of Ministers announced the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST). The next year, the seven major Western economic powers (G7): Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States issued the "Bonn Declaration" against hijacking. The following years witnessed a number of similar declarations and statements announced at each annual economic summit of the G7. For example, in 1980 the "Venice Declaration" dealt with protection of diplomats, and the 1984 "London Declaration" condemned state-supported terrorism (10:89); however, the watershed statement against terrorism came in 1986 at the Tokyo Summit. (Excerpts from G7 declarations appear in Appendix Two.)

Previously, summit statements had conveyed varying degrees of enthusiasm, reflecting often diverging national views on the issue. In Tokyo, however, the seven leaders reaffirmed their condemnation of international terrorism (particularly with respect to Libya), and outlined a number of pro-active measures designed to combat it.(11) The following year in Vienna, the G7 took an even firmer stand by strengthening their determination to prosecute or extradite suspected terrorists, by underscoring their commitment to increased cooperation in the investigation and apprehension of terrorists, and by announcing punitive measures

to be taken against any nations not supporting the G7 position.(12)

While these multinational concepts were emerging, most members of the European Economic Community (EEC) and G7 were simultaneously enacting domestic policies on counter and anti-terrorism. The keystone of U.S. policy--the Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism (13)--provides the most coherent unilateral statement on the subject, although EEC and other G7 nations' policies, once not as clearly defined, are coming into sharper focus, reflecting a more coordinated multilateral stance.(14:53)

The purpose of this study is to outline policy aspects of select European and G7 conventions and declarations on terrorism, compare those policies with individual G7 nations' policies, then use that comparison to answer three basic questions:

1. What is the nature and essence of public opinion within the G7 that could provide guidelines for governmental action?
2. What are the feasible and practical principles and procedures for action against international terrorism?
3. What kind of decision-making framework could serve the G7 in the environment of international terrorism?

Without consensus on answers to these questions, it is very likely that the frequency and severity of terrorist action will increase in the future.(15:274)

CHAPTER II

POLICY COMPARISONS

For several reasons, it is appropriate to analyze G7 and EEC policies, both individually and collectively, in the search for a multilateral approach to terrorism. First of all, these nations represent an extremely large percentage of the targets. In 1985, 31.8% of all terrorist incidents occurred in the EEC and G7 regions, and if the Middle East were omitted from the equation, the percentage would be 63%.(13:3) Second, the G7 is "...uniquely situated to apply the sorts of collective pressures that can demonstrate meaningful opposition to state-supported terrorism." (14:53) Finally, because of its well-developed institutional structures, the EEC may be better suited to deal with problems that are specifically European.(14:58)

The ECST was opened for signature 12 years ago to extend ...extradition and relevant mutual assistance to the members to prevent the impunity of fugitive terrorists [and]...establish a uniform juridical attitude towards extradition in the matters of terrorism....[The] Convention fits into the existing framework of European law and should not be seen as an independent legal instrument.(2:232)

The outline in Table 1 highlights several key elements of the ECST--foremost of which is that its rule of prosecute or extradite (*aut dedere, aut judicare*) applies only where an extradition agreement or treaty already exists. Developed before terrorism had become a dominant issue, the document represents a 'soft' first attempt at regional cooperation on counterterrorism. Even then it suffered--as so many other

TABLE 1

REGIONAL POLICY COMPARISONS

<u>ECST</u>	<u>TOKYO (VIENNA) SUMMIT</u>
PURPOSE: Combat terrorism by (2:232) strengthening extra- dition laws.	United condemnation of terrorism. ¹
PARTICIPANTS: EEC	G7
APPLICABILITY: Nations with (2:232) existing treaties or agreements.	U.N., I.C.A.O., I.M.O., voluntary. (11)
DEFINITION: NONE ²	General understanding.
POLITICAL OFFENSE: (5:13-14): Strict interpretation. ^{3,4}	N/A
MEASURES: Legal (National under EC umbrella).	Combination of national and international. (11) -Arms export -Size of diplomatic and con- sular missions -Denial of entry into G7 -Improved extradition -Stronger immigration and visa requirements -Close cooperation between security, police, <i>et al.</i>

1. Specifically denounces Libya and other states supporting terrorism. (Strengthens 1978 Bonn Declaration.) (11;12)

2. Avoids creating a "terrorist offense" or international crime.

3. Excludes a number of crimes from list of political offenses: hijacking, attacks against internationally protected persons, kidnapping, hostage taking, and offenses involving explosives or firearms. (2:233)

4. Leaves several loopholes that could block extradition. *Aut dedere, aut judicare* applies (5:13) as *primo dedere, secundo judicare*. (2:236)

succeeding efforts have--from lack of an agreed definition of just what terrorism is.

Moving from the "fuzziness" of separate and diverse initiatives of the 1970s through the more coordinated approach of the early 1980s to the focused efforts of the latter part of the decade, the G7 summit statements have been catalytic in developing action and support for policies to combat terrorism. Having just weathered the worst period of international terrorism in history, it is hardly coincidental that those nations' resolve had toughened so.(16)

Until the mid 1980s, many European nations followed a damage-limiting line of thinking, in some cases looking the other way when known terrorists were within their borders, or even going so far as to make deals with terrorist groups to avoid bloodshed at home.(4:1336;17) The multilateral approach, encouraged to a large degree by the two main targets, the U.K. and U.S., was an on-again, off-again affair, regulated by legislatures and domestic issues as much as anything.

The tide began to turn in late 1985 and early 1986 as a series of events pushed the EEC and others beyond the limits of tolerance. In addition to "normal" terrorist activities, the *Achille Lauro* affair, the *La Belle* discoteque tragedy and the airport bombings in Rome and Vienna served to outrage the Western powers sufficiently to issue the Tokyo Summit statement (highlighted on Table 1) condemning all terrorism, particularly that which was state-sponsored.(11)

The G7 then reaffirmed and expanded this position the next year in Vienna.

1. Measures against terrorists, terrorist groups and states supporting terrorism include:(11)
 - a. Refusal to export arms.
 - b. Strict limits on the size of diplomatic and consular missions and other official bodies. Control of travel of members of those missions and bodies. Closure of missions and bodies, where appropriate.
 - c. Denial of entry to all persons, including diplomatic personnel, who have been expelled from another G7 state for terrorism.
 - d. Improved extradition procedures.
 - e. Stricter immigration and visa requirements for nationals of states which support terrorism.
 - f. The closest bilateral and multilateral cooperation between police, security organizations "and other relevant authorities."
2. There was also agreement to strengthen the 1978 Bonn Declaration, making it more effective "in dealing with all forms of terrorism affecting civil aviation."(11;12)

One interesting aspect of the Tokyo statement was its timing. Barely three weeks after the U.S. raid on Libya, and the aftermath of public criticism in Europe, the seven heads of government or state stood as one in specific condemnation of terrorism. Later that year, both France and Italy--previously regarded as soft on terrorism--established themselves as leaders in the effort to secure firm, effective policies against state-sponsored international terrorism.(18:30,19:13) Another point worthy of note was the official call for "the closest bilateral and multilateral cooperation..." among the G7.(11) Suddenly, the

international press overflowed with reports of anti-terrorist initiatives: "SIS director calls terrorism top priority."(20) "EEC ministers hear new proposal for tracking terrorists."(21) "West Germany and France sign agreement on counterterrorism cooperation."(22)

During the year between the Tokyo and Vienna summits, several European nations signed bilateral accords on counterterrorism, as did Canada and Japan the following year.(23,24) And on 28 May 1987, with mutual support growing among the members of the EEC and G7, France and Germany called a meeting of the ministers of justice or interior from the G7 plus Belgium and Denmark. The meeting served both to prepare the counterterrorism agenda for the Vienna Summit and to break ground for a truly concerted drive against terrorism.(25) Always sensitive to the views and opinions of others, the European G7 nations finally decided strong multinational counterterrorism was feasible if they all made the first bold step together. Moreover, such a move would show European leadership rather than followership after the U.S. The data in Table 2 outline the position of the G7 nations on various aspects of the counter and antiterrorist policies.

Had Table 2 appeared in 1985, it would have shown European policies to be hazy, tenuous and, in some cases, nonexistent. Today, although still not unanimous, the nations are demonstrating a strong, directed resolve to fight terrorism, particularly state-supported terrorism. As the comparison shows, European members of

the G7 are now in agreement on most major issues. Even where agreement is lacking, so too is harsh disagreement; and, with the exception of pursuit across borders, the North American members of the G7 have similar, if not stronger, policies. Much of the explanation for this great turnaround lies in the answers to the questions in this paper.

TABLE 2

NATIONAL POLICY COMPARISONS

POLICY	CANADA ¹	FRANCE	GERMANY	ITALY	U.K. ²	U.S. ² (JAPAN ³)
Extra- dition	Bilateral	ECST	ECST	ECST	ECST	Bilateral
Economic Sanctions ⁴ (26)	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Reluc- tant (40:289;41)	Moderate (32)	Favors(42)
Concessions (27:63)	No	No	No	No	No	No
Antiterrorist Assistance Program(27:63)	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Pursuit Across Borders (EEC) (28:16)	No	Yes	Yes ⁵	Yes	Yes	No
Intelligence Cooperation (29:2;30:44)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Diplomatic/ Visa/Immig- ration	Yes (31)	Yes (26;29:1)	Yes (29:1)	Yes (29:2)	Yes (43)	Yes (44:33)
Military (34:619;47)	Strong (35)	Strong (26;36)	Ambi- valent (37)	Reluctant ⁶	Strong/ Moderate (48)	Strong (47)
Prosecution/ Detention	Strict (20)	Strict (38)	Strict (39)	Strict (39)	Strict ⁷ (45)	Strict (49:659)

1. Joining with Japan in counterterrorist activities.
2. Also signatories to U.S.-U.K. Supplemental Extradition Treaty.
3. Except where it concerns oil, Japan generally supports U.S.(46)
4. TREVI established working group to assess freezing IRA and Mideast terrorist assets.(32)
5. Federal and state police have access to central computer information system.(33)
6. Varies with party in power.(40:289)
7. Repealed "Right to Silence" in N. Ireland. Legislation pending in England and Wales.(45)

CHAPTER III

PUBLIC OPINION

By 1984, U.S. concern about international terrorism had grown to the point that in April, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138 directed, *inter alia*, that no nation could condone terrorism; terrorism was a problem for all nations; and the U.S. would work with other governments to deal with all forms of terrorism, especially that which was state-sponsored. NSDD 138 went further to state the U.S. would use all available channels to dissuade states from supporting terrorism and reaffirmed the right of self-defense.(10:112-113)


Although the NSDD was clearly appropriate, it once again placed the U.S. in a position of trying to prod its allies into action. In this case, the European members of the G7 did not share the U.S. sense of urgency, and, in a few previous instances, had acted in direct opposition to our efforts. Italy had worked occasional side deals with certain terrorist groups, including Libya, and France had developed an "understanding" with Syrian-sponsored terrorists.(4:1336) In principle, the U.K. policy supported NSDD 138(43), while Germany tried to walk the tightrope between the Green Party liberals and the Christian Democrats--combatting domestic terrorism firmly, yet trying to remain moderate internationally.(50) Canada and Japan followed a policy of low profile support for the U.S.

One month before the attack on Libya, Market and Opinion

Research International polled citizens in France, Germany and the U.K. on several issues surrounding the terrorist problem. The results, shown in Table 3, revealed the general public of the leading European nations as wanting a stronger response than their governments had, as yet, adopted, and (in hindsight) forecast the trend towards a stronger stance among the French--probably as a result of the growing proliferation of terrorist attacks in France during 1985. All nations opposed military responses, and U.K. opposition to U.S. initiatives was explained as a British reaction against other U.S. policies in Europe, multinational corporation takeovers and the cruise missile issue.(50) During the same period, Italy had been cleaning house, taking a look at the need to promote peace and stability in the Mediterranean area, reevaluating its relationship with Libya, and assessing its performance during the *Achille Lauro* episode.(18:30)

Early in 1986, several key political events occurred in the United States, answering that public's demand for action. Among these were the publication of the Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism and the passage of the Omnibus Security and Anti-Terrorist Act of 1986. No doubt, these also helped to underpin G7 consensus against terrorism, because their echoes began to sound throughout the various European capitols.(18,29,43,50) Even though the European community was immediately critical of the 14 April 1986 attack against Libya, on 21 April the foreign ministers of the EEC condemned Libya, banned further arms sales, called for a reduction

TABLE 3
PUBLIC OPINION POLL (50)



The New York Times POLL

European Views On Terrorism

	Britain	France	West Germany
Steps that would curb international terrorism			
Military action against terrorists	29%	22%	22%
Much stricter airport security	63	69	65
Military action against governments that support terrorists	15	16	12
Economic sanctions against governments that support terrorists	34	48	39
Pressure on Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians	16	20	15
Government can do nothing	9	7	5
Don't know/no answer	9	9	17
U.S. military action against terrorists every time an attack affected Americans . . .			
. . . would reduce international terrorism	17	27	22
. . . would make things worse	64	45	45
U.S. is getting overexcited about terrorism			
	41	21	19

Based on 1,951 face-to-face interviews in Britain Feb. 8-12, 1994 in France Feb. 7-21 and 2,007 in West Germany Feb. 1-10. European interviews coordinated by Market and Opinion Research International.

of Libyan diplomats, urged increased surveillance of potential terrorists and established closer intelligence ties. Four days later, the EEC ministers of the interior, the TREVI Group, began to put their ideas into action (34:619), and on 5 May in Tokyo, the leaders of the G7 confirmed those initiatives.

What forces served to overcome the inertia in the EEC and G7, mobilizing those nations to coordinated multilateral cooperation? The answer, like the question, is complex; but certainly, part of the reason must lie with public opinion. The growing number of incidents, casualties and deaths over the years leading to 1986 had to have profoundly affected the attitudes and lives of citizens everywhere. Robert Oakley, a former Assistant Secretary of State for Counterterrorism, places the average number of terrorist incidents between 1979-1983 around 500 each year.(34:613) In 1984, however, the curve rose to 650 incidents and to over 850 in 1985.(13:4) Concurrently, the number of casualties jumped from 1279 in 1984 to 2200 in 1985 (34:613) and had a direct effect on U.S. tourism in Europe.

During 1986, as the incidence of terrorist activity rose and the value of the dollar fell, cancellation of hotel reservations, tours and airline tickets approached 50% in some countries. While life and death issues, aggravated by economic pressures, have a way of solidifying public opinion, "public support for sanctions is much easier after evidence is made public."(34:621) Therefore, as proof of Libyan sponsorship of the *La Belle* bombing became more widely known and terrorist activity

within France's borders increased French resolve (51), France began to emerge as a leader against, instead of a conduit for, terrorism.

In 1986-1987, as new concerted international efforts, bolstered by public opinion, began to bear fruit, anti-U.S. attacks dropped 25% and European terrorism dropped 31%.(27:61) By early 1988, public support for counterterrorism had become so strong that World Opinion Update reflected an overwhelming belief by Europeans that arrest and trial of terrorists was possible, regardless of the EEC nation to which the individual had fled.(52)

CHAPTER IV

PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES

During the TREVI Group meeting of 25 April 1986, one European politician remarked:

...Frequently, the Europeans have been too satisfied with mere declarations which have been politically ineffectual while leaving the U.S. alone in its struggle against international terrorism....If we Europeans do not want to follow the Americans for reasons of our own, we must develop political initiatives.(51)

Since that meeting, a significant number of actions and agreements have transpired to form a cohesive structure for effective counterterrorism, supported (within domestic legal constraints) by the entire G7 and most of the EEC. The framework of that structure, using the U.S. policy as an example, has five major points. Interwoven throughout is an urgent requirement for government-media cooperation which would, "Integrate media into the national security design." (58) Responsible representatives of the media can greatly assist any counter or antiterrorist program by not playing into the terrorists' strategies for publicity (57:45), thus avoiding unnecessary loss of life or disclosure of plans. Similarly, the media can create stronger public opposition to, and greater awareness of terrorism, thereby providing a public information service.(9:18) The Fifth Estate can be a formidable two-edged sword that must be both self-motivating and self-policing.

The five major points are (44):

1. Make no concessions, no deals, no ransom, no bargains, and give no immunity for terrorists or terrorist groups.
2. Continue applying an ever-increasing amount of pressure on states sponsoring terrorism. This pressure includes, but is not necessarily limited to: economic sanctions, placement on the list of states supporting international terrorism, the measures announced at the Tokyo Summit, appropriate military or paramilitary action (16:26), and freezing or confiscating financial assets of terrorists.(32)
3. Use all practical means for protection. This element of the policy is the most active and has made the most progress:
 - a. The TREVI has established a means for fast exchange of information on a facsimile hotline.(21)
 - b. The TREVI and G7 are providing intelligence and technical assistance to each other and have established a permanent liaison office to facilitate mutual support activities.(19)
 - c. There is now an agreed threat assessment as well as INTERPOL coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.(30:49)
 - d. Various nations' antiterrorist assistance programs are aiding an increasing number of nations.(27:63)
 - e. EEC nations may pursue terrorists across national borders.(28:16)
 - f. Each nation is publicly announcing the importance of the terrorist threat, as well as establishing a network of supportive bilateral treaties and agreements. [Much work remains, however, in the area of responding to chemical, biological and nuclear terrorism, and there is still a vital need for an improved conventional capability.(44:337)]
4. Improve legal cooperation for extradition and trial of terrorists. The issue of "territorial supremacy and sovereign equality" causes states to be reluctant to involve themselves in another's domain (53:9), yet all EEC members have agreed to the ECST and the non-European members of the G7 have an extensive series of extradition agreements. As it becomes increasingly clearer to terrorists that stepping across a border

no longer provides sanctuary, a major element of their mobility and security will evaporate.

- a. The U.N. has also focused its concept of terrorist activities, providing a stronger basis for international legal action against hostage taking and the endangerment of life and the fundamental freedoms.(54:52-53)
 - b. If "extradite or prosecute" is the practiced policy, trust and support among participating nations will advance considerably.
5. Insure swift and severe punishment for convicted terrorists and states supporting terrorists. Thanks to changes in nations' attitudes in the last few years, this part of the counterterrorist policy has also experienced significant gains.
- a. Japan has stepped up pressure on groups within its borders while strengthening its cooperation and coordination with the West.(55)
 - b. In some nations, habeas corpus has become fairly fuzzy in its application to terrorists.(57:299)
 - c. European nations are more willing to consider use of military force (16,26), particularly if such action is justified under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. (10:119)

Systematic efforts guided by these five points are now beginning to appear throughout G7 counterterrorist programs, and for the first time there is hope for controlling the threat, not just managing it.

The varied and deeply rooted bases of terrorism are not within the purview of this analysis. While others work to address the injustices and inequities that fuel the terrorists' causes, multinational actions giving rise to the phrase *oderint dum metuant* (let them hate so long as they fear)(56:45) will serve to help protect potential innocent victims.

CHAPTER V

DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK

If public opinion and governmental concern have provided the impetus for a true, coordinated, multilateral counter and antiterrorist policy, and if there are adequate and suitable principles and procedures to implement that policy, what decision-making framework would best suit the G7 (and the EEC) in executing those procedures?

Obviously each nation must enact legislation to carry out its domestic programs, and in the case of the G7 and EEC, adequate statutes exist. Rising above the domestic issues into the international fora, legislative instruments become scarce. There are initiatives to make international terrorism an international crime (49:669), and Secretary of State Schultz, *et al.*, have suggested the possibility of further developing a body of international law to assist multinational cooperation. (54:41) There is an ample body of conventions, protocols and agreements to form the basis of that law, (Appendix One) but they first must overcome the definitional barrier discussed at length in much loftier documents. In the interim, the search continues for an oversight or coordinating or steering body to direct this massive effort.

The Omnibus Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 directs the President to seek the establishment of a standing political committee under NATO to examine all aspects of international terrorism, review opportunities for cooperation, and make recommendations to member nations. Following the establishment of such a committee, the Act instructs the Presi-

dent to invite other countries to participate. Thus, what will begin as a regional committee under the auspices of NATO, will hopefully evolve into a truly significant international body. (49:669)

On the other hand, European NATO members have opposed this idea on the grounds it diverts NATO from its main purpose. Furthermore, many Europeans do not share the U.S. view that the Soviet Union is the premier protagonist behind international terrorism. They view the matter as a police problem, best suited for ministers of the interior and national police. (10:88) Our European allies have further resisted the creation of yet another international organization to address counterterrorism, stating that agencies such as the Council of Europe and the TREVI are more than adequate. (10:90)

While these agencies do not officially include the U.S., progress--European style--is evident in the burgeoning display of bilateral agreements and cooperation. Just a few examples include: the April 1987 agreement between France and Germany which established permanent liaison officers and a better exchange of information (22); the exchange of information between France, Germany and Italy that helped France fight two terrorist networks; French and Spanish information that led to the capture of a Red Brigade Group in Italy; and U.S. assistance that helped France uncover hidden explosives in Fontainbleau. (19) Nothing succeeds like success, and on 10 March 1988, in hopes of preventing another *Achille Lauro*, the U.S. and 22 other nations signed an

antiterrorist treaty on maritime security, administered under the International Maritime Organization (I.M.O.).(58)

European Council, TREVI, EEC, G7, bilateral, ECST, International Civil Aviation Organization, I.M.O., U.N., INTERPOL, F.B.I., national police--there certainly appear to be more than enough bodies, agencies, conventions and agreements to oversee any number of multilateral counter and antiterrorist programs. Underlying the international umbrella are the domestic programs which proliferate even further. The U.S. Federal Policy Group on Terrorism includes 10 major departments and agencies, the Office of the Vice President, the National Security Council and an advisory group representing 24 other organizations.(10:91)

One important order of business would be to streamline these organizations as much as the complexities of the problem will allow. Once it is certain the participants are the proper ones, free of internecine politics and parochialism, those agencies can turn their attention to developing a responsive organizational structure to coordinate in the international arena.

Internationally, bureaucracies move even more slowly than domestic organizations; therefore the hope of a new body or committee--under NATO or not--has little chance of short to mid-range success. Long-term achievements are for the endless and often tedious work of the diplomats.(10:91) For now and the foreseeable future, there are enough channels of communication and avenues of approach to support any reasonable program to combat international terrorism. G7 and EEC cooperation, augmented by

stronger extradition treaties and more unified policies, has already brought about a significant reduction in the number of international terrorist incidents against the members.(27:61) It therefore seems prudent to let the increasingly-tied system run long enough to judge its merit. One thing is certain, any initiative that is too short-lived to establish a trend analysis has little chance of success.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is now fairly conclusive that unilateral programs to stem terrorism have not been nearly as successful as multilateral efforts. What is not quite as clear is what the long-term form and substance of those efforts should be. The reality of cultural, political and historical diversity between nations of the free world all but insures the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism. That does not mean, however, there cannot be a general consensus on who the enemy is, and in that regard, the framework provided by the inductive definition of the threat appears to be the most promising. Quoting the late Senator "Scoop" Jackson:

The idea that one person's 'terrorist' is another's 'freedom fighter' cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't blow up busses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate innocent men, women and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word 'freedom' to be associated with acts of terrorists.(59:72)

Defining the threat is a big step, but it is only the first step. The next moves involve intelligence--where is the threat coming from; what is the target; what are the objectives? Recognizing the magnitude of the challenge and the inadequacy of going it alone, the EEC and G7 have pooled their intelligence resources to make a combined attack against international terrorism.

Inpol, an international computerized intelligence network

that enables the rapid exchange of national intelligence, has already proved its worth by analyzing terrorist finances, communications, support systems, and documentation procedures, while leading to the seizures of weapons and the arrests of terrorists.(61:242) Major cooperation on intelligence matters, begun by TREVI after the raid on Libya, has now developed a momentum of its own.

If the G7 can agree on an inductively determined threat and continue to develop and strengthen cooperation on intelligence matters, then what body or organization should oversee matters dealing with policy and implementation? At the moment, the most reasonable idea lies in a loosely-knit amalgam of foreign ministries, ministries of the interior (and attorney general), appropriate intelligence organizations, and other governmental agencies, as required. In other words, the current assembly of players, tied together by the present body of conventions, protocols, treaties and handshakes may be the best solution for this imperfect world.

Because each nation has unique historical ties to other nations, it would be presumptuous to assume that every player's response to every threat will be identical. Italy may not agree to fully participate in a particular action against Libya; nor may Germany choose the same policy against Turkish terrorists. Overall, however, the give and take of the nations as a whole will present a unified front.

How should that front look? In February 1988 Secretary

Schultz presented a policy that could support the five major points discussed in Chapter IV and provide both structure and flexibility in international fora. Stating that "...behavior rewarded is behavior repeated.," he underscored the necessity of not making any deals with terrorists. Relying on increased intelligence cooperation, he called for improved security measures for embassies and airports as well as for internationally protected persons. Finally, he reiterated the need to streamline international legal procedures and pressure those states supporting terrorism to cease their activity.(61:242)

As the Western nations increase their attack against international terrorism, it will be important that they adhere to the four Cs: consensus, credibility, clarity and consistency. Acknowledging that unity does not necessarily mean all nations follow the same path, the G7 can only demonstrate a singular purpose when the threat is recognized by consensus. Similarly, that unity of action only takes on meaning when the credibility of follow-through on policy is real. In turn, the clarity of that policy must be based on carefully selected rationale, clearly presented at every opportunity; and it must be consistent, properly balancing principle, politics and economics.(1:98-101)

The legacy of a democracy is its people. Without public support or approval, any program, no matter how well-intentioned, will eventually fail. It is therefore crucial that our efforts include a cooperative and responsible media, working with government, to both inform and protect the public. An

international counterterrorist triad of government, press and public will be hard to beat. If, however, that triad does not take form and the separate parts work independently of each other, the field of international terrorism will continue to widen, and the grizzly momentum of the past two decades will accelerate into the 21st century.

APPENDIX ONE

United Nations Resolutions, Declarations, and Conventions

U.N. General Assembly, Resolution on Forcible
 Diversion of Civil Aircraft in Flight, January 1970
 U.N. General Assembly, Resolution on the Question
 of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons,
 January 1970
 U.N. Security Council, Resolution on Prevention of
 Hijackings or Any Other Interference with Inter-
 national Civil Air Travel, September 1970
 U.N. General Assembly, Declaration on Principles
 of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
 and Cooperation among States in Accordance with
 the United Nations, October 1970
 U.N. General Assembly, Resolution on Aerial Hijacking
 or Interference with Civil Air Travel, November 1970
 U.N. General Assembly, Resolution on the Question of
 Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons,
 January 1972
 U.N. Security Council, Decision of the Security Council
 on Hijacking, June 1972
 U.N. General Assembly, U.S. Draft Convention for
 the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of
 International Terrorism, September 1972
 U.N. General Assembly, Resolution on Measures to
 Prevent International Terrorism which Endangers or
 Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Funda-
 mental Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes
 of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence
 which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and
 Despair and Which Cause Some People to Sacrifice
 Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to
 Effect Radical Changes, December 1972
 U.N. General Assembly, Resolution on Basic Principles
 of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling against
 Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes,
 December 1973
 U.N. General Assembly, Resolution on Principles of
 International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest,
 Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
 Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, December 1973 ...
 U.N. General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention
 and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
 Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,
 February 1974
 U.N. Special Committee on Defining Aggression,
 Report of the Special Committee on the Question of
 Aggression, December 1974

Extract from: Terrorism/Documents of International and Local Control.
 Friedlander, Robert A. Dobbs Ferry, NY, Oceana Publi-
 cations, Inc., 1979.

U.N. Security Council, United Kingdom and United States Joint Draft Resolution Condemning Hijacking, July 1976

U.N. Security Council, Benin, Libyan Arab Republic and United Republic of Tanzania, Draft Resolution, July 1976

U.N. General Assembly, Resolution on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, January 1977

U.N. General Assembly, Resolution on Drafting of an International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, January 1977

U.N. General Assembly, West German Draft Convention against the Taking of Hostages, July 1977

U.N. General Assembly, Resolution on the Safety of International Civil Aviation, November 3, 1977

U.N. Economic and Social Council, International Association of Penal Law Statement on the Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment and in Particular the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, February 1978

Interference with Air Transport

**International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
Report of Subcommittee on Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, February 1969**

**International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
Report of Subcommittee on Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, October 1969**

**International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
Resolutions Adopted by The Extraordinary Assembly,
June 1970**

**International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
Security Measures of Regular and Urgent Nature
Approved by ICAO Assembly, June 1970**

**Council of Europe, Resolution on Air Piracy,
September 1970**

Council of Europe, Recommendation on Air Safety
and Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, September 1970

Statement of President Richard M. Nixon Announcing
a Program to Deal with Airplane Hijacking, September
1970

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
Resolution Adopted by the ICAO Council on the
Safety and Security of International Civil Air Trans-
port, October 1970

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
Legal Bureau, Additional Items on the Agenda Resulting
from Resolutions of the ICAO Council, October 1970

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
Resolution Adopted by the ICAO Council on the
Safety and Security of International Civil Air Trans-
port, and the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, October
1970

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
U.S. Draft Convention Regarding the Safety and
Security of International Civil Air Transport Services,
1970

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
Legal Committee, Draft Convention on Acts of
Unlawful Interference Against International Civil
Aviation (Other than Those Covered by the Draft
Convention on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft), 1970

The Hague Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, December 1970

Montreal Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage),
September 1971

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
Resolution Adopted by the ICAO Council on the
Implementation of Uniform Standards and the
Utilization of Recommended Security Practices,
June 1972

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
Joint Proposal on Organization and Consolidation
of the Work of the Committee, September 1972

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
Legal Committee, Draft Protocol to the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
Signed at The Hague, January 1973

United States and Cuba, Memorandum of Under-
standing on Hijacking of Aircraft and Other Offenses,
February 15, 1973

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
Resolution Adopted by the ICAO Assembly Appealing
for Signatures to the Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal
Conventions, September 1973

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Hijacking
Attempts against Scheduled U.S. Aircraft, August
1977

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Hijacking
Attempts on U.S. and Foreign Aircraft, August 1977 ...

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Hijacking
Attempts on U.S. General Aviation Aircraft, August
1977

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), World-Wide
Reported Hijacking Attempts, August 1977

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Bomb
Threats Against U.S. Airports, August 1977

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Bomb
Threats Against U.S. Aircraft and Foreign Aircraft
in the U.S., August 1977

European Attempts to Control Terror-Violence

Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers Resolution
on International Terrorism, January 1974

Council of Europe, European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism, November 10, 1976

Appendix TWO

Declarations of the Summit Seven on International Terrorism, 1978-1987

1. Bonn Economic Summit Conference

*Joint Statement on International Terrorism,
July 17, 1978*

The heads of state and government, concerned about terrorism and the taking of hostages, declare that their governments will intensify their joint efforts to combat international terrorism.

To this end, in cases where a country refuses extradition or prosecution of those who have hijacked an aircraft and/or do not return such aircraft, the heads of state and government are jointly resolved that their governments should take immediate action to cease all flights to that country.

At the same time, their governments will initiate action to halt all incoming flights from that country or from any country by the airlines of the country concerned. The heads of state and government urge other governments to join them in this commitment.

NOTE: Chancellor Helmut Schmidt read the joint statement during his remarks at the Bonn Stadt Theater at the conclusion of the Bonn Economic Summit Conference.

Source: *Public Papers of the Presidents*, Jimmy Carter, 1978.

Extract From: Democracies Against Terror--The Western Response to State-Supported Terrorism. Levitt, Geoffrey M., New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1988.

2. Tokyo Economic Summit Conference

*Joint Statement on Hijacking, Read As Part of
Prime Minister Ohira's Remarks to Reporters at the
Conclusion of the Conference, June 29, 1979*

PRIME MINISTER OHIRA. Now, then, I would like to open the joint press conference.

To this summit there have gathered a great number of members of the press from Japan and from outside Japan, and for showing your interest in what goes on in the summit, I would like to express our appreciation. Because of security considerations, we may have caused you many inconveniences, but I hope you understand this.

Our conference during the past 2 days has been extremely useful, but in order for the fruit of our discussions to be appreciated in various parts of the world, much depends on you members of the press. I would be grateful for your cooperation.

I am going to shortly ask various heads of state and government to speak, but as the host, I would first like to give my overall evaluation.

In this summit we have welcomed three new members, of whom one is the first woman Prime Minister to the summit and the other is the youngest Prime Minister. The two new Prime Ministers have contributed much to the success of the conference with their charm and wisdom. The third new member is somewhat older, me, and I would refrain from making any comment.

Although nearly half of the members in this summit are new, I believe our summit has been able to create an extremely close human relation on the basis of the spirit of mutual support of the summit, which I believe is an important product of our endeavor.

This summit has been held as it was at the time when the attention of the world is focused on the oil problem. In order to respond to the situation, it has been said that our summit will be a failure unless bold and concrete measures are agreed upon.

Shortly the communiqué will be distributed to you, but from the viewpoint of both immediate measures and medium- and long-term points of view, I believe we have been able to reach concrete consensus that can respond to meet the expectations of the world.

As the Prime Minister of Japan, to give the specific goal of our effort to the year 1985 has taken considerable amount of courage, but recognizing the fact that we all live in a global community faced with the oil anxiety, and recognizing the need for placing our economy on a stable basis well into the future, I felt it was necessary for us to agree to that statement.

In areas other than oil, we have discussed questions such as inflation and employment, showing strong interest in protecting industrial democracies, from long-term and fundamental points of view. Although industrialized economies find ourselves in respective economic difficulties, the summit leaders have shown strong interest in the relationship with the developing nations. I have found this very encouraging. The old economies of the world are in the same boat. By sharing the new sense of responsibility and new sense of partnership, I would like to see the constructive relationship and cooperation be developed further.

Further, in the present summit, following up on what was taken up in the last summit in Bonn, we adopted a statement on air hijacking, which I will now read.

"All the heads of state and government" – excuse me, I take it back; I have the wrong text in front of me. *[Laughter]*

This is concerning the statement. At the request of heads of state and government who participated in the summit, I, in my capacity of chairman of the meeting, am pleased to make the following statement which concerns the declaration of air hijacking issued in Bonn in July 1978. I now read the statement.

"The heads of state and government express their pleasure with the broad support expressed by other states for the declaration on hijacking made at the Bonn Summit in July 1978.

"They noted that procedures for the prompt implementation of the declaration have been agreed upon and that to date enforcement measures under the declaration have not been necessary.

"They also noted with satisfaction the widespread adherence to the conventions dealing with unlawful interference with international civil aviation. Extensive support for these conventions and the Bonn declaration on hijacking reflects the acceptance by the international community as a whole of the principles expressed therein."

That is the statement.

Also, in the present summit, we have adopted a special state-

ment on the question of refugees from Indochina,¹ which is another major fruit. Japan itself feels we must make our utmost contribution to the solution of this problem, and I would like to see that the statement be transmitted to other various countries and various international organizations and invite their further participation in international efforts on this question.

This has been an unprecedentedly important international event, but this Tokyo summit has now come to its safe and successful conclusion, and next year we have unanimously agreed to meet again in Italy. We look forward to our reunion in Italy.

And I would like to take this opportunity to express our heartfelt appreciation to all the people, both within and without Japan, who have supported this meeting. Because we have taken

¹[Issued on June 28 by the seven nations meeting at the Tokyo Economic Summit.]

STATEMENT ON INDOCHINESE REFUGEE CRISIS

The plight of refugees from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia poses a humanitarian problem of historic proportions and constitutes a threat to the peace and stability of Southeast Asia. Given the tragedy and suffering which are taking place, the problem calls for an immediate and major response.

The Heads of State and Government call on Vietnam and other countries of Indochina to take urgent and effective measures so that the present human hardship and suffering are eliminated. They confirm the great importance they attach to the immediate cessation of the disorderly outflow of refugees without prejudice to the principles of free emigration and family reunification.

The governments represented will, as part of an international effort, significantly increase their contribution to Indochinese refugee relief and resettlement by making more funds available and by admitting more people, while taking into account the existing social and economic circumstances in each of their countries.

The Heads of State and Government request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a conference as soon as possible with a view to attaining concrete and positive results. They extend full support to this objective and are ready to participate constructively in such a conference.

The Heads of State and Government call on all nations to join in addressing this pressing problem.

unexpected, unprecedentedly elaborate security measures in connection with the convening of this summit – and I know we have dealt inconveniences with many people, but because of their cooperation we have been able to successfully carry this conference. I thank all of these people concerned.

Thank you very much.

Source: Public Papers of the Presidents, Jimmy Carter, 1979.

3. Venice Economic Summit Conference

*Statement on the Taking of Diplomatic Hostages,
June 22, 1980*

Gravely concerned by recent incidents of terrorism involving the taking of hostages and attacks on diplomatic and consular premises and personnel, the Heads of State and Government reaffirm their determination to deter and combat such acts. They note the completion of work on the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages and call on all States to consider becoming parties to it as well as to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons of 1973.

The Heads of State and Government vigorously condemn the taking of hostages and the seizure of diplomatic and consular premises and personnel in contravention of the basic norms of international law and practice. The Heads of State and Government consider necessary that all Governments should adopt policies which will contribute to the attainment of this goal and to take appropriate measures to deny terrorists any benefits from such criminal acts. They also resolve to provide to one another's diplomatic and consular missions support and assistance in situations involving the seizure of diplomatic and consular establishments or personnel.

The Heads of State and Government recall that every State has the duty under international law to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organised activities within its territory

directed towards the commission of such acts, and deplore in the strongest terms any breach of this duty.

NOTE: Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga of Italy, Chairman of the Conference, issued the statement to the press on behalf of the Conference participants.

As printed above, this item follows the text of the English translation made available by the White House. It was not issued as a White House press release.

Statement on Hijacking, June 22, 1980

The Heads of State and Government expressed their satisfaction at the broad support of the international community for the principles set out in the Bonn Declaration of July 1978 as well as in the international Conventions dealing with unlawful interference with civil aviation. The increasing adherence to these Conventions and the responsible attitude taken by States with respect to air-hijacking reflect the fact that these principles are being accepted by the international community as a whole.

The Heads of State and Government emphasize that hijacking remains a threat to international civil aviation and that there can be no relaxation of efforts to combat this threat. To this end they look forward to continuing cooperation with all other Governments.

NOTE: Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga of Italy, Chairman of the Conference, issued the statement to the press on behalf of the Conference participants.

As printed above, this item follows the text of the English translation made available by the White House. It was not issued as a White House press release.

Source: Public Papers of the Presidents, Jimmy Carter, 1980.

4. Ottawa Economic Summit Conference *Statement on Terrorism, July 20, 1981*

1. The Heads of State and Government, seriously concerned about the active support given to international terrorism through the supply of money and arms to terrorist groups, and about the sanctuary and training offered terrorists, as well as the continuation of acts of violence and terrorism such as aircraft hijacking, hostage-taking and attacks against diplomatic and consular personnel and premises, reaffirm their determination vigorously to combat such flagrant violations of international law. Emphasizing that all countries are threatened by acts of terrorism in disregard of fundamental human rights, they resolve to strengthen and broaden action within the international community to prevent and punish such acts.

2. The Heads of State and Government view with particular concern the recent hijacking incidents which threaten the safety of international civil aviation. They recall and reaffirm the principles set forth in the 1978 Bonn Declaration and note that there are several hijackings which have not been resolved by certain states in conformity with their obligations under international law. They call upon the governments concerned to discharge their obligations promptly and thereby contribute to the safety of international civil aviation.

3. The Heads of State and Government are convinced that, in the case of the hijacking of a Pakistan International Airlines aircraft in March, the conduct of the Babrak Karmal government of Afghanistan, both during the incident and subsequently in giving refuge to the hijackers, was and is in flagrant breach of its international obligations under the Hague Convention to which Afghanistan is a party, and constitutes a serious threat to air safety. Consequently the Heads of State and Government propose to suspend all flights to and from Afghanistan in implementation of the Bonn Declaration unless Afghanistan immediately takes steps to comply with its obligations. Furthermore, they call upon all states which share their concern for air safety to take appropriate action to persuade Afghanistan to honour its obligations.

4. Recalling the Venice Statement on the Taking of Diplomatic Hostages, the Heads of State and Government approve continued cooperation in the event of attacks on diplomatic and con-

sular establishments or personnel of any of their governments. They undertake that in the event of such incidents, their governments will immediately consult on an appropriate response. Moreover, they resolve that any state which directly aids and abets the commission of terrorist acts condemned in the Venice Statement, should face a prompt international response. It was agreed to exchange information on terrorist threats and activities, and to explore cooperative measures for dealing with and countering acts of terrorism, for promoting more effective implementation of existing anti-terrorist conventions, and for securing wider adherence to them.

Conference Participants

President Reagan, Prime Minister Trudeau, President François Mitterrand of France, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki of Japan, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini of Italy, and Gaston Thorn, President of the Commission of the European Communities.

Source: Public Papers of the Presidents, Ronald Reagan, 1981.

5. London Economic Summit Conference

Declaration on International Terrorism, June 9, 1984

1. The Heads of State and Government discussed the problem of international terrorism.

2. They noted that hijacking and kidnapping had declined since the Declarations of Bonn (1978), Venice (1980) and Ottawa (1981) as a result of improved security measures, but that terrorism had developed other techniques, sometimes in association with traffic in drugs.

3. They expressed their resolve to combat this threat by every possible means, strengthening existing measures and developing effective new ones.

4. They were disturbed to note the ease with which terrorists move across international boundaries, and gain access to weapons, explosives, training and finance.

5. They viewed with serious concern the increasing involvement of states and governments in acts of terrorism, including the abuse of diplomatic immunity. They acknowledged the inviolability of diplomatic missions and other requirements of international law; but they emphasised the obligations which that law also entails.

6. Proposals which found support in the discussion included the following:

- closer co-operation and co-ordination between police and security organisations and other relevant authorities, especially in the exchange of information, intelligence and technical knowledge;
- scrutiny by each country of gaps in its national legislation which might be exploited by terrorists;
- use of the powers of the receiving state under the Vienna Convention in such matters as the size of diplomatic missions, and the number of buildings enjoying diplomatic immunity;
- action by each country to review the sale of weapons to states supporting terrorism;
- consultation and as far as possible co-operation over the expulsion or exclusion from their countries of known terrorists, including persons of diplomatic status involved in terrorism.

7. The Heads of State and Government recognised that this is a problem which affects all civilised states. They resolved to promote action through competent international organisations and among the international community as a whole to prevent and punish terrorist acts.

Source: Public Papers of the Presidents, Ronald Reagan, 1984.

6. Tokyo Economic Summit

Statement on International Terrorism, May 5, 1986

1. We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major democracies and the representatives of the European Community, assembled here in Tokyo, strongly reaffirm our condemnation of international terrorism in all its forms, of its accomplices and of those, including governments, who sponsor or support it. We abhor the increase in the level of such terrorism since our last meeting, and in particular its blatant and cynical use as an instrument of government policy. Terrorism has no justification. It spreads only by the use of contemptible means, ignoring the values of human life, freedom and dignity. It must be fought relentlessly and without compromise.

2. Recognizing that the continuing fight against terrorism is a task which the international community as a whole has to undertake, we pledge ourselves to make maximum efforts to fight against that scourge. Terrorism must be fought effectively through determined, tenacious, discreet and patient action combining national measures with international cooperation. Therefore, we urge all like-minded nations to collaborate with us, particularly in such international fora as the United Nations, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization, drawing on their expertise to improve and extend countermeasures against terrorism and those who sponsor or support it.

3. We, the Heads of State or Government, agree to intensify the exchange of information in relevant fora on threats and potential threats emanating from terrorist activities and those who sponsor or support them, and on ways to prevent them.

4. We specify the following as measures open to any government concerned to deny to international terrorists the opportunity and the means to carry out their aims, and to identify and deter those who perpetrate such terrorism. We have decided to apply these measures within the framework of international law and in our own jurisdictions in respect of any state which is clearly involved in sponsoring or supporting international terrorism, and in particular of Libya, until such time as the state concerned abandons its complicity in, or support for, such terrorism. These measures are:

- refusal to export arms to states which sponsor or support terrorism;
- strict limits on the size of the diplomatic and consular missions and other official bodies abroad of states which engage in such activities, control of travel of members of such missions and bodies, and, where appropriate, radical reductions in, or even the closure of, such missions and bodies;
- denial of entry to all persons, including diplomatic personnel, who have been expelled or excluded from one of our states on suspicion of involvement in international terrorism or who have been convicted of such a terrorist offence;
- improved extradition procedures within due process of domestic law for bringing to trial those who have perpetrated such acts of terrorism;
- stricter immigration and visa requirements and procedures in respect of nationals of states which sponsor or support terrorism;
- the closest possible bilateral and multilateral cooperation between police and security organizations and other relevant authorities in the fight against terrorism.

Each of us is committed to work in the appropriate international bodies to which we belong to ensure that similar measures are accepted and acted upon by as many other governments as possible.

5. We will maintain close cooperation in furthering the objectives of this statement and in considering further measures. We agree to make the 1978 Bonn Declaration more effective in dealing with all forms of terrorism affecting civil aviation. We are ready to promote bilaterally and multilaterally further actions to be taken in international organizations or fora competent to fight against international terrorism in any of its forms.

Source: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 22, no. 19 (May 12, 1986).

7. Venice Economic Summit

Statement on Terrorism, June 9, 1987

Terrorism

We, the heads of state or government of seven major democracies and the representatives of the European Community assembled here in Venice, profoundly aware of our peoples' concern at the threat posed by terrorism:

- Reaffirm our commitment to the statements on terrorism made at previous summits, in Bonn, Venice, Ottawa, London and Tokyo;

- Resolutely condemn all forms of terrorism, including aircraft hijackings and hostage-taking, and reiterate our belief that whatever its motives, terrorism has no justification;

- Confirm the commitment of each of us to the principle of making no concessions to terrorists or their sponsors;

- Remain resolved to apply, in respect of any state clearly involved in sponsoring or supporting international terrorism, effective measures within the framework of international law and in our own jurisdictions;

- Welcome the progress made in international cooperation against terrorism since we last met in Tokyo in May 1986, and in particular the initiative taken by France and Germany to convene in May in Paris a meeting of ministers of nine countries, who are responsible for counterterrorism;

- Reaffirm our determination to combat terrorism both through national measures and through international cooperation among ourselves and with others, when appropriate, and therefore renew our appeal to all like-minded countries to consolidate and extend international cooperation in all appropriate fora;

- Will continue our efforts to improve the safety of travelers. We welcome improvements in airport and maritime security, and encourage the work of I.C.A.O. and I.M.O. in this regard. Each of us will continue to monitor closely the activities of airlines which raise security problems. The heads of state or government have decided on measures, annexed to this statement, to make the 1978 Bonn Declaration more effective in dealing with all forms of terrorism affecting civil aviation;

- Commit ourselves to support the rule of law in bringing terrorists to justice. Each of us pledges increased cooperation in

the relevant fora and within the framework of domestic and international law on the investigation, apprehension and prosecution of terrorists. In particular we reaffirm the principle established by relevant international conventions of trying or extraditing, according to national laws and those international conventions, those who have perpetrated acts of terrorism.

Annex

The heads of state or government recall that in their Tokyo statement on international terrorism they agreed to make the 1978 Bonn Declaration more effective in dealing with all forms of terrorism affecting civil aviation. To this end, in cases where a country refuses extradition or prosecution of those who have committed offenses described in the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation and/or does not return the aircraft involved, the heads of state or government are jointly resolved that their Governments shall take immediate action to cease flights to that country as stated in the Bonn Declaration.

At the same time, their governments will initiate action to halt incoming flights from that country or from any country by the airlines of the country concerned as stated in the Bonn Declaration.

The heads of state or government intend also to extend the Bonn Declaration in due time to cover any future relevant amendment to the above convention or any other aviation conventions relating to the extradition or prosecution of the offenders.

The heads of state or government urge other governments to join them in this commitment.

Source: "Venice Statements on East-West Relations, Terrorism and Persian Gulf," New York Times, June 10, 1987.

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